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FORMS OF ACTION.
The origin of Forms of Action is to be traced to the Roman
law. It will be curious and instructive to recur to the history of
the subject, in its connection with that system. Among other
deficiencies remarkable in the Code of the Twelve Tables, was an
entire omission of regulations concerning the manner in which the
laws were to be enforced. It is obvious that the proceedings in
every court of justice must be conducted according to some fixed
and invariable rules of practice; yet the laws of the Decemvirs
were altogether silent on this subject, and the advantages which
the patricians derived from the omission may warrant the. inference that their silence was not involuntary. The common forms
of law were made a matter of religion; and the people, always
obedient to the voice of superstition, were easily persuaded that
certain solemn ceremonies were indispensable to the administration of justice. The college of pontiffs, in conjunction with the
jurisconsults, had the exclusive direction of these ceremoniesthey were technically called act0one8 legum. Like the diem fasti
-and nefati, they were kept a profound secret from the community at large, so that, though the letter of.the law was open to the
inspection of every citizen, it was impossible for any one to avail
himself of it in the courts without the aid of the initiated. This
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violation of justice, gross and evident as it was, continued for a
long time to hold its ground, supported by the religious veneration
of the whole people, as well as by the political influence of the
patricians. The secret was carefully kept, and the actione8 long
remained a profitable mystety to those who had invented them. A
fortunate circumstance, however, at length effected the subversion
of the whole system. One Cneius Flavius Cwcus, the son of a
freedman, had been employed as the secretary of Appius Claudius, to transcribe a collection of the actionea which his master
had made, and either at the instigation of the patrician, who
might wish to ingratiate himself with the plebeians, or more probably without his knowledge, published his manuscript. The
plebeians appear to have been fully aware of the value of the
knowledge they had acquired. Flavius was loaded with honors,
and the code which he had made public was ever afterwards known
by the appellation of Ju8 ivle _lavianum. Yet it is remarkable
that notwithstanding their estimation of the privilege they had
gained, by being admitted to a knowledge of all the mysteries of
practical jurisprudence, and notwithstanding that, soon after the
office of Sovereign Pontiff was thrown open to them, yet they
allowed the patricians to invent a new system of forms, and the
wheels of justice became clogged with other obstacles. Still it
seems that as the secrets of law had not ceased to be considered
secrets of religion, the vulgar were always excluded from a participation in the knowledge of them. It has been supposed on the
authority of a passage in Cicero, in his Oration Pro $Hurcena,that
the new code of legal forms was written in a sort of cipher, expressly invented for the purpose. He says that upon the publication of Flavius, the jurisconsults, angry. because they feared that
by the promulgation of the dies fasti et nefasti, and of the
calendar, law proceedings might be carried on without themnotas qua8dam composuerunt, ut omnibus in rebus ipsi interessent
-invented certain marks, that their assistance might still be
necessary in all legal business. However this may be, about a
century after the publication of the Jus Rlavianum, the whole
system was again brought to light, and that by a patrician.
Sextus (Elias was the author of this second publication.
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The publicity given to the actiones did away, to a great extent,
the injustice of the whole system. The signification of the
term actio was, however, materially changed in later times, so
that the forms of legal procedure, which bear the same name in
the compilation of Justinian, are not to be confounded with those
of the Jus Plavianum, or of the Jus (Elianum. The difference is
attributable to the ascendency acquired by the Prietorian law ; to
the frequent innovations that took place in the legislature; to the
change that was gradually operated in the spirit and character 6f
the civil jurisprudence; and finally to the total subversion of the
groundwork on which the whole fabric had been erected-the national religion.
The actiones were at first, as their name in, some measure
implies, certain forms- symbolically expressed by outward or corporeal signs. These were as.various as the different legal act8 to
which they gave validity. Thus the well-known forms employed
in the emancipation of children or of slaves-the purchase-money
weighed-the blow struck by the father-were legal actions which
were not performed as mere matter of ceremony, but because the
neglect of them would have invalidated the manumission., In the
same manner, the delivery of an iron ring in the celebration of
nuptials, was an i.tirn absolutely necessary to constitute a legal,
marriage. Numerous instances might be quoted of ceremonies"
frequently mentioned by classic authors, which it is usual to
regard as ceremonies only, but which, in reality, had a much more
imperious claim to be generally observed. In most cases, it was
n~cessary to pronounce some appointed sentence at the time of
performing the action. Every one recollects the animated picture
given by Horace of the manner in which a witness was secured.
The words it"Iicet Antestari " were necessary to constitute the act
a legal one; nor (at one period at least) would the action have
been complete without the ceremony of touching the witness bythe ear. The word memento was afterwards to be pronounced by.
the suitor. So intimate, indeed, was the -connection between the
formal words to be spoken, and the action to be performed, that
the appellation actio legi is supposed to have arisen from the
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original actions having been adapted to the very letter of the old
laws.
The custom of conducting legal transactions by means of cor.
poreal signs probably owed its origin, among the Romans as
among the Jews and many modern nations, to the unfrequent use
of writing. It is one that has invariably been found to decline in
proportion as civilization and refinement have advanced. Witness,
for example, the practice that has gradually gained ground in
England of neglecting the old forms or actions that were necessary for the-' conveyance of real property. This is one instance
out of a hundred. However, the inconvenience and awkwardness
of corporeal actions, which have generally been the reason of their
falling into disuse, were not the only motives for their suppression
at Rome. The original inventors of these conventional signs
had made them so complex, and had enforced the observance of
them so strictly, that it became almost impossible to conduct a
sult, through all its stages, without the omission of some aetion,
which, however puerile in itself, was absolutely essential to "the
success of the cause. The slightest error was fatal; and the combinations of different symbols at length became so various and so
intricate, that some errors the most experienced lawyers might
often find themselves unable to avoid. This being the case, it was
agreed to abolish the whole system of signs, and to supply their
place by verbal formulae. This was accomplished by the (Ebutian
and Julian laws.
The principal improvement- that the abolition of the original
actions introduced into the judicial proceedings, was a more
liberal construction of errors, and a less rigid adherence to the
minutiae of the legal forms. A collectidn of formuhe or writs was
always at hand, to be consulted by every citizen; and there was
no species of injury, or no kind of claim, but could be redressed
or prosecuted by means of precedents adapted to it. As the
positive provisions of the legislature could not with propriety be
openly transgressed, indirect means were found to elude them.
Fictions of law, similar to those of which the English courts offer
so many examples, were allowed; and it became usual in doubtful
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cases, for litigants to employ two different actions, with a proviso
that they were to abide by the right one. Such expedients as
these were, however, unnecessary after the reign of Constantine,
who almost entirely destroyed the efficacy of the legal formulce.
Thenceforward judicial proceedings became more simple, and consequently better understood. The word actio, it is true, still remained.
but it has been already remarked that it had entirely lost its
primitive signification: Burke's Laws of Rome 121, &c.
Let us turn to a brief examination of the History of the Common Law of England, in regard to Forms of Action. I entertain
no doubt that they owe their origin in part to the feudal system,
and in part to the influence of the Roman laws. While the laws
and policy of England were in what may be termed its forming
state, the chancellors were ecclesiastics, and to them was intrusted
the power by the issuing of the original writ, of vesting in the
King's Court jurisdiction of any particular case. These ecclesiastics were, to some extent, educated in the forms and principles
of the civil law. Besides which, -when the Anglo-Saxons first
settled in England, their law, like that of the Britons, was entirely oral and traditionary. It was a common law existing as the
common law of England still exists in customs, whether local or
national, recorded in the memory of the judges, and published by
the practice of the tribunal. Before the introduction of Christianity, the northern nations annexed the functions of the judge
to the sacerdotal office, and some of the traditions of the law can
be curiously elucidated by the fables of ancient superstition and
mythology :" Palgrave 42. ",The Teutons attached the greatest
importance to their technical forms and proceedings. Of these,
the most numerous are preserved in the Codes of the Norwegians,
though some of great singularity are extant amongst the AngloSaxon customs. Every act by which- an obligation was incurred,
by which civil rights were acquired or created, which constituted
a stage in the suit, or was connected with its process, required to
be enounced in the phraseology, and accompanied by the rites,
which immemorial tradition had provided. The plaint or appeal
preferred to the court, the betrothal of the maiden, the legitima-
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tion of the child, the manumission of the slave, all had their peculiar forms, and with the nicety which afterwards characterized the
Anglo-Norman law, the variance of a word or the lapse of a
Practice and expesyllable annulled the entire proceeding ....
rience could alone teach these forms: the important knowledge
was not generally diffused amongst the people, and the law was
concealed with jealousy from the profane multitude by the wise
and powerful ' Lawmen:'" Id. 148.
It is certain that at a very early period, specific forms of action
were provided by the law of England for such injuries as had then
most usually occurred. The ancient forms of action were termed
brevia formata, and were collected in a book called 1?egistrum
.Brevium. - I have," says Lord CoxK, (8 Rep. Pref.), ,a register
of our writs, originally written in the reign of King Henry II.

(in whose time GLANVILLE wrote), containing the original writs,
which were long before the Conquest, as in the said Preface to
the third part appeareth ; and yet also remaining in force,. &c.,
which is the best book yet extant of the common law, and so ancient as the beginning whereof cannot be showed." The compilation of this very ancient book has been ascribed to RALPH DE
RINGHAM, Chief Justice in the reign of Edward I. It was printed
as early as 1531, and its authority in former times was very great.
At common law, also, though no forms could be found in the
Register adapted to the nature of the plaintiff's cases yet he was
at liberty to bring a special action on his own case, and writs
were framed accordingly which were termed magistralia;but as
the officers of the court were found reluctant in new cases to
frame the proper remedy, the legislature thought fit to enforce the
the common law, and it was enacted by statute Westm. 2
(19 Edw. I.), "that if it shall fortuhe in the chancery, that
in one case a writ is found, and in like case, falling under like
law and requiring like remedy, is found none, the clerks in
chancery ihall agree in making the writ, or adjourn the plaintiffs until the next Parliament, and that the cases be written
in which they cannot agree, and that they shall refer such cases
until the next Parliament; and by consent of men learned in the
law, a writ shall be made, lest it might happen after, that the

. FORMS OF ACTION.

711

court should long time fail to minister justice unto complainants."
To this statute the great encouragement and frequency of actions
on the case is attributed. It has, however, been observed that it
by no means follows, that because in cases unprovided for by the
Register, the statute of Westm. 2, directs an action on the case to
be framed, that such action did not subsist at common law.,
Notwithstanding these provisions, it was once thought that the
circuthstance of an action being of the first impression and unprecedented, constituted a conclusive objection against it; but this
notion no longer prevails, for it is an established maxim of the
common law, that wherever there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy; and Lord Chief Justice PRATT, in answer to the
objection of novelty, said that he wished never to -hear it, urged
again, for torts are infinitely various, not limited or confined, for
there is nothing in nature that may not be an instrument of mischief, and the special action on the case was introduced because
the law will not suffer an injury withcut affording a remedy, and
there must be new facts in every special action on the case ; and
in the case of Paisley vs. Freeman, 3 T. R. 63, Mr. J. ASHIURST
observed, that where cases are new in their principle, it is necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in order to
remedy the grievance ; bat where the case is only new in he
instance, and the only question is upon the application of a pranciple recognised by law-to such new case it will be just as competent to courts of justice to apply the acknowledged principle to
any case which may arise two centuries hence, as it was two centyuries ago. However the novelty of an action may frequently be
fairly urged as a strong presumptive argument against it, more
particularly where the right, which is the foundation of the action,
is admitted, but the mode of relief is the only matter in controversy.
When the prescribed form of action is to be found in the
Register, the proceeding should not materially vary from it, unless in those cases where another form of action has long been
sanctioned by usage; for the courts have considered it of tho
greatest importance to observe the boundaries of the different ac-
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tions, not only in respect of their being most logically framed, and
best adapted to the nature of each particular case, but also in
order that -causes may not be brought into court confusedly and
immethodically, and that the record may at once clearly ascertain
the matter in dispute: I Chit. on Plead. 86.
It might be curious to trace the history of forms of actions in
the English law. Many of the ancient forms, especially of real
actions, are practically obsolete, from the introduction of simpler
remedies, and from the extension of the jurisdiction of chancery.
Nevertheless, time has gradually impressed important modifications on all existing forms.
In Pennsylvania it has been established by repeated decisions
of the Supreme Court, that all common law actions, which have
not been abolished by the legislature, are in force here precisely
as they are in England: Barnet vs. lhe, 17 S. & R. 211.
It is to be observed that in chancery there are no particular
forms of action. The equity which the plaintiff sets up is indeed
declared upon in his bill, in a certain order and method established by precedent, but there is nothing there to which the power
of amendment does not reach. Extensive as is the power of
permitting amendments conferred upon our courts by the legislatu'je, it has not as yet reached the case of permitting the form of
the action to be amended.
It'is an important question, then, whether our system should be
changed in this respect?
It is certain that in many cases, the lines which distinguish onb
form of action from another are very indistinct. The most prudent and well-informed lawyer may occasionally make a mistake.
To all but the profession, the law of forms of action is in a great
measure a sealed book. The constitutional privilege which every
suitor has of conducting his own suit in court, cannot be exercised
but at the utmost peril of fatal mistake. Even supposing the
mistake ascertained in time to prevent it from being fatal to the
cause, the party -loses all his time, trouble, and expense, and must
commence his action anew. It is not to be denied that this is
often fraught with gross injustice. It is usually argued, however,
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that such cases of particular hardship ought to be borne for the
sake of the advantages which accrue from legal forms; that without form the pursuit of justice would be a confused scramble; the
points of controversy would not be ascertained with any precision,
and courts would be a scene of indecent personal altercation and
prolonged controversy, if the parties were allowed to make their
complaints and defences without some system and order. This may
all be admitted without yet reaching the marrow of the question.
That order and system should exist; that no party should be
allowed to prove matter of complaint or defence which he had not
first alleged; that the case should be so conducted that the controversy be reduced to certain fixed questions of law or fact, upon
which the parties are at issue, and the decision of the tribunal is
invoked: these are plain matters, which common sense and experience alike show to be essential to the decent, orderly, and
expeditious administration of justice. The same results have, however, always been found attainable in courts of equity, without
the trammels of those forms of action of which we are speaking.
The true question may be thus stated: Why may not a plaintiff be allowed to summon a defendant to appear in court to answer any complaint which he may exhibit against him ; or, if you
please, some specific complaint-being a statement of facts-setout in or accompanying the summons? Why should he be required in his summons to give his complaint a specific name- call
it an action of trespass, case, .debt, or detinue-on the peril that
if he makes a mistake in'this particular, if he assigns a wrong
name to his aet;9n, however well founded in law and justice his
cause may be, he shall lose it, and be turned out of court in some
instances, with the entire and irremediable loss of his claim, and
in all with a judgment against him for costs ? It is to be observed
that, with the exception of perhaps not more than one case in
which a fiction is allowed-the action on the case for trover and
,onversion-our declarations set out merely the grounds of the
plaintiff's complaint in technical languagq, to be sure. but still in
a way sufficiently intelligible to a plain mind. If the question at
issue involved the existence of lawyers, as a learned profession, it
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would be one thing. Experience shows that it does not. No
change in the forms and modes of proceedings-no simplification
of proofs and pleading, can ever dispense with counsellors and
advocates. Law will always be a complicated and difficult science,
demanding the lucubrations of many years exclusively devoted to
the study of it. The trial of causes in court, the examination of
witnesses, and the discussions of the rights of parties, will ever
continue to demand men of skill, experience, ingenuity, and eloquence. Thus the profession of the law stands in an impregnable
position, and lawyers mistake their true interest in supposing that
any system which prevents the administration of justice according
to law, by the interposition of essential forms in legal proceedings,
tends to their advantage. Men avoid law-they submit to loss
rather than invoke its aid, when the necessary fallibility and uncertainty of human judgment, in all cases, is increased by the
multiplication of technical questions not bearing upon the real
merits of the cause. These considerations appear to us entitled
to weight upon the question, whether these technical forms-the
necessity of truly classifying a' cause of action-in the very first
instance, the first step in the suit. should not be abolished?
We are free to say, however, that it is a very important step,
certainly not to be hastily adopted. Fortunately for us, our large
and prosperous sister state of New York has adopted, and is now
trying the experiment of such a change. A few years will determine whether it can be safely introduced, and whether there are
advantages resulting from it which render it worth the trial and
the endurance of those partial and temporary inconveniences,
which never fail to accompany an entire change of the code of
procedure in courts of justice. The history both of the Roman
and Common Law on this subject, show a gradual approximation
to such a system,-a system which discards, whenever practicable,
mere technical formalities.
It may be observed, in addition, that one great argument in the
mouths of those .who stand up for the existing forms, is usually
drawn from a characteristic of the old-system, which may be said
practically no longer to be in use. Special pleading, which, as it

